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Book Reviews
Cases and Materials on Contracts, EDITED BY J. B. MILNER. TORONTO:
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS. (1963). pp. xxvii, 897. $22.00.
In recent years, several casebooks prepared by Canadian pro-
fessors of law have become available to the Canadian law student.
An important addition to the list is Cases and Materials on Contracts,
edited by Professor J. B. Milner. The occasion of this publication
warrants an analysis not only of the new book itself but also of the
significance of the whole paedogogical development of casebook
materials from the point of view of the student.
A parochial disregard of the achievements of other legal juris-
dictions is not a necessary condition for the development of a dis-
tinctively Canadian jurisprudence. In fact, the gathering together of
the Canadian materials from the various provinces, in conjunction
with those from the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia
and New Zealand might have a very invigorating effect on the devel-
opment of Canadian law. In particular it might help to dispel the
sycophantish colonial outlook of Canadian courts in regard to English
decisions, viz: the extent to whicch rules of stare decisis in Canada
entail, in practice, the binding effect of English decisions here.
If Canadian students are made aware early of the truth that
various approaches to special problems have been attempted by the
different provinces, and that not only are there gaps in each but also
definite contradictions inter se, then certain principles of jurisprudence
may become widely accepted: first, that each province in Canada
may have a different line of "binding" precedents on a problem, to
the extent that no solution has been propounded by the Supreme
Court of Canada; second, that no approach taken by the court of
another jurisdiction is of any authoritative value until it is adopted
by the instant court; third, that decisions from other jurisdictions
will have relevance to the solution of the problems in a case only
to the extent each has substantive merit, and not according to the
"name" of the court which uttered them.
Only then will Canadian courts experience fully, as a conscious
fact, the freedom of choice which is necessarily present in the making
of every decision. It is submitted that the only possible result of
conscious judicial choice (as opposed to subservient reliance upon
English decisions) can be the creation of a higher quality of Canadian
law.
Yet the addition of Canadian materials to the more widely known
decisions in a particular field of the other jurisdictions will not be
sufficient per se to induce in the student this sense of judicial freedom.
In Contracts, the actual working of the legal process is more obscured
by the seeming inevitability of logical analysis of a small number of
basic axioms than in any other field, except perhaps, the Conflict of
Laws.
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No fruitful insights will result from a mere reading of English
and Canadian decisions together, unless the correct questions are
posed. To bring this type of answer to the law student, a casebook
requires a combination of judicious editing of the cases, juxtaposition
of various cases in novel and unexpected ways, interposition of
selected legal readings and non-legal materials and the proposal of
certain inquiries conducive to the raising of important issues, all in
the context of the overall arrangement of the course.
Two broad tendencies are discernable in the selection and arrange-
ment of casebook materials. The first emphasizes the importance of
logic in the -law and attempts to make the order of the casebook con-
form to that of the leading texts in the field. For each step in the
orderly or logical arrangement of the rules (i.e. of contracts) there
is included a corresponding case which almost inevitably is the leadingjudicial pronouncement on the point. In the Canadian context, this
is inevitably either from the Supreme Court or from the highest
English court which has dealt with the problem. Attention is paid
to specific configurations of facts (i.e. regarding offers to auctions,
advertisements, price quotations, etc.) but only insofar as there has
developed a specific rule applicable to these facts, and only to the
extent of including the case upon which this rule depends.
The other broad tendency has as its basis a conception of the
legal process as one of the various means whereby society achieves and
sustains certain ends and of legal decisions of value only insofar as
it conduces to this task. The casebook is one of the principal tools
used to train the permanent participants in the process and its con-
tents and arrangements have no other raison d'etre than the develop-
ment of "law-men" adequate for their roles. A particular case is
viewed basically as "a little segment of human history, history of an
event or of an idea, or of both." An adequately trained legal mind
does not determine the desirable result to this "segment of history"
by means of logically impeccable syllogisms or precise dissection of
expressions in previous authorities. Rather it seeks to fashion a
"type-situation" upon which consciously articulated value judgments
can be brought to bear. It is my opinion that Professor Milner's case-
book falls within the latter category and in this review I shall attempt
to show how.
The first chapter is devoted to an analysis of the various remedies
available for a breach of contract. From the logical viewpoint, this
is the reverse of the proper order. However, if one considers that
the law is basically a means to an end and not a pure logical entity
sufficient unto itself, then nothing is more important for an evaluation
of it as an ongoing process than the knowledge of what will be the
result of its intervention in a particular situation. It might be noted
that at Osgoode Hall Law School, the course in Contracts is given in
the first year while any consideration of remedies is left to the second
year (damages in the course in Sale of Goods and specific performance
in the course in Equity).
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The next chapter attempts a definition of the various outside
limits of the enforcement by the courts of promises. Grouped together
are such "logically discrete" subjects as seals, consideration, intention
to create legal relations, illegal or immoral contracts and the Statute
of Frauds. The functional problems raised in respect of the first three
are almost identical and the unnecessary anomalies which are caused
in this regard by a too rigid adherence to a basic opinion are amply
demonstrated in a group of cases, entitled merely "Alternatives to
Consideration." A brief excursus into comparative law, in the form
of an investigation of the civil law basis of jurisdiction over contracts,
is a very useful "eye-opener" for any first year student intrigued by
the possibility of a near mathematical necessity in the common law
principle of contracts. What the editor feels perhaps may be inferred
from his rather dry understatement to the effect that "the people of
some civil law countries seem to be both happy and prosperous."
The following chapter, the heart of the course, analyzes the
attitude of the Courts towards the negotiation process and assesses
the occasions when the court should and will feel the transaction has
sufficiently progressed that its intervention is justified. The labels the
courts use are 'offer", "acceptance", "revocation", etc., (supplemented
by Hohfield and Corbin with the terms "power", "liability", "privi-
lege", "right", "duty", etc.). However, the emphasis in arrangement
of the cases and the interspersed questions and notes point the student
towards the more substantial considerations underlying the language.
As an example, one whole section is devoted to cases involving nego-
tiations where the parties are not face to face, and furnishes an
excellent opportunity for assessment of the utility of such concepts
as "consensus ad idem", still seen in the cases. The editor also per-
forms a service in logic by his separation of the problems raised in
such cases as Raffles v. Wicheihaus and Smith v. Hughes into a
separate category called "ambiguity of terms". Analysis in terms of
sufficiency of negotiation is preferrable to a grouping into an overall
class of "mistake". That logic, even if it has no inherent efficacy
toward good, may do a great deal of harm, is demonstrated by what
would happen under the latter type of analysis if Hughes had sued
Smith. In any event, the "type-situation" problems raised are com-
pletely different from those present in the so-called "common mistake"
cases which are probably better posed in conjunction with the analysis
of "unexpected changes in circumstances."
The editor again groups in the same chapter, under the heading
"written contracts and standard forms", three problems ordinarily
considered to have no logical connection: the "Tickets Cases", Non
Est Factum, and the Parole Evidence Rule. The common factor in
the cases is not a formal one, but rather is the fact that they involve
contracts of adhesion. They are best understood as attempts by the
courts, by means of "interstitial legislation", to fit modern oligopo-
listic enterprise into legal rules developed from the philosophy of a
bygone age. Even the conservative judge no longer acts according
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to the view that a contract is merely the free expression of two morally
autonomous wills (in a pseudo-Kantian sense) and thus beyond the
regulative purview of the law.
The limitations inherent in the judicial process may be grasped
by reflection upon the efforts of courts to treat contract-making as a
private, delegated or subordinate, legislative power, and to work out
rules governing this private-law-creation.
What may be the best chapter in the book deals with the prob-
lems of the "condition" and the various legal effects that have been
attributed to a situation by judges through the use of this word.
Integrated into the discussion of condition as a fact and as a promise
(and as distinguished from a warranty) is a consideration of the
problems of misrepresentation (fraudulent and innocent) and common
misapprehension (Solle v. Butcher), and of the various legal effects
and remedies thereof (especially the concept of rescission). In my
opinion the Contracts course at Osgoode Hall should be altered to
allow all these problems to be discussed together in order that each
be more fully understood. In this chapter, the editor performs another
service by grouping into two sections a variety of cases involving
building and employment contracts respectively. This is of value for
two reasons: first, it enables the student to test his analytic powers
by evaluating various approaches to one functional situation; second,
it is the only place in the course of studies where these problems can
be dealt with as one separate integrated whole.
The reviewer has one important reservation concerning the
value of this casebook. Besides frequent reference to Fuller, Basic
Contract Law, there is almost a complete absence of recognition of
scholarly work in contracts law. Not only is there very little incor-
poration of supplementary materials into the text itself, but there
is no attempt at all to systematically indicate-to the student the bet-
ter, outside reading available. The editor explains as his reason for this
omission, that he is afraid that the student will be kept from develop-
ing his own powers of independent analysis by a search for the answer
to all problems in the statement of others. Although this is a valid
point, it is perhaps misdirected in the case of a first-year law student
in a course such as contracts. In my opinion the real danger is rather
that the student will accept the reasoning of the cases as inevitable
and unquestionable, and go no farther in analysis than attempting to
make them all consistent. Surely the best antidote towards this is
acquaintance with several different and intelligent (though perhaps
inconsistent) criticisms of a line of decisions. Nor can open-minded
scepticism be induced by the teacher's criticism alone, for the inevit-
able impulse towards certainty will merely be transferred to his inter-
pretation.
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This one caveat notwithstanding, Professor Milner has performed
for the benefit of students of the law of contracts a very creditable
service. As one who believes that, from an existential point of view,
the law is not "a brooding omnipresence in the sky", but rather a
developed ability to think in a particular way, I would commend the
use of this book by all teachers endeavouring to educe this capacity
in law students.
P. C. WEiLER, M.A.' :
*'Mr. Weiler is a graduate of the University of Toronto. He is a student
in the third year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
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